The reality of debts and deficits
Saturday, July 17, 2010
Keywords: Economics
"Reagan proved deficits don't matter." --Dick Cheney
Let us look at some numbers. The Greek public debt is around 130% of their GDP. As we all know, their government was in danger of insolvency, and as a result, Greece became the focus of an European sovereign debt crisis. The United States public debt is projected to reach 100% of our GDP next year. In light of what happened in Iceland and Greece, this sounds rather ominous, does it not? But let us look at one more figure: the Japanese public debt is around 230% of their GDP, and it has been well over 100% of GDP for many years. Yet, there is no danger of Japanese insolvency. There is no Greek-style crisis in Japan, despite the Japanese public debt dwarfing that of Greece. As another example, the United States public debt following the Second World War was 130% of our GDP, yet, aside from a brief economic dip as troops demobilized, the post-war economy was strong and robust; that huge public debt, which was larger than our current debt load, did not adversely affect our economy.
So how are Japan and post-war America different from Greece? Let us look at another number: 94% of Japanese public debt is held by the Japanese. Essentially, Japan owes Japan money. As long as the vast majority of the Japanese government's borrowing is domestic, deficits do not pose a threat of insolvency for the Japanese government (there are, to be sure, other problems with chronic deficits of this sort, but insolvency is not one of them). Likewise, virtually all of the debt that the United States accumulated during the Great Depression and World War II was held by Americans. Greece, however, is in a different situation, as most of their debt is held by foreigners, such as the German and French banks that purchased Greek bonds, and this is why Greece was in danger of insolvency.
What about our current debt load? What about the trillion dollars worth of our debt held by the Chinese? The vast majority—over 70%—of our debt is held by us. Investment portfolios, pension funds, university endowments, etc. all hold treasury bonds. This means that we are not really "leaving our children in (much) debt" because, in the future, to pay off the debt, Americans will have to (mostly) pay back Americans. While the news media seems very fixated on large-sounding numbers such as one trillion dollars of Chinese-held debt, they neglect to point out that one trillion dollars represents less than 7% of our GDP. Treasury bonds have been and are still considered one of the safest investments on the planet, making it attractive to foreigners and may partly explain why our foreign share of debt is higher than that of Japan's: because foreigners want to buy our debt, not because we need them to buy our debt.
Much is also made about the Chinese government's stash of treasury bonds and the notion that the Chinese government can use the threat of a pullout to dictate terms to our government. This is ridiculous because the reason why China holds so many treasuries is because this is their way of illegally manipulating the currency markets and keeping their currency, the RMB, grossly undervalued (using the spread between the nominal and PPP GDP per-capita as a rough estimate, the RMB is valued at nearly half of its true value). The undervalued RMB is how China maintains chronic trade surpluses, and as such, we neither need nor want them to hold so many treasuries. If they pull out, the RMB will rise against the dollar (something that Americans have long been calling for), and manufacturing would flow from China back to the United States (something that Americans have been longing for). In short, a Chinese abandonment of treasury bonds would hurt the Chinese government much more than it would hurt us, which is why there is no risk of that happening. That, of course, does not stop the Chinese government from loudly beating its chest and making thinly veiled threats, but in reality, those threats are empty and it is actually the United States who holds the greater leverage.
Finally, like the Japanese, our debt is denominated in our own currency, which, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this discussion, makes insolvency even more unlikely. Yet, despite all this, there are many people who are calling for immediate deficit reductions. While chronic deficits are indeed undesirable, they are necessary in the short term when faced with a deflationary, demand-slack recession (which is the polar opposite of an inflationary, supply-shortage economic crisis like that of Zimbabwe's, though that does not seem to deter some people from comparing them to us). We have been down this path before: Hoover's attempts at deficit reduction in the middle of a demand-slack recession drove us deeper into the Great Depression, and it took an enormous binge of deficit spending (the New Deal and the war, but mostly the war) to create the demand to pull us out of our downward spiral. For some, the problem is one of understanding: after all, it is easy to look at Iceland and Greece and, without any understanding of what fundamentally sets them apart from us or the Japanese, think that we could very well fall into the same trap as them. For others, unfortunately, the problem is one of politics. Whether it is to advance one's agenda or to discredit the current administration, many are making use of unfounded deficit scares. To borrow Upton Sinclair, "It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his political advancement depends upon his not understanding it!"
I will discuss the current crisis in general in my next post, when I get around to it.
This entry was edited on 2010/07/22 at 22:18:17 GMT -0500.
